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Angelo
S. Lazzarotto, PIME Twenty years ago, as a friend in Shanghai told me, the drive towards the four modernizations initiated by paramount leader Deng Xiaoping was already running. Like a train launched full steam: it could not be stopped. We can say today that it has even gained speed over the past two decades. 1982: Year of consolidation Generally speaking, 1982 was a year of consolidation for the People's Republic of China (PRC) with a major bureaucratic reform pushed through by Premier Zhao Ziyang, and a new Constitution approved by the National People's Congress (NPC). Before the vote was taken on December 4, 1982, the draft was offered for public discussion.1 It gained wide approval, as it provided greater guarantees for the citizens. Article 36 on freedom of religious belief was more elaborated than in previous constitutions.2 With many things rapidly changing in Chinese society, people enthusiastically embraced the dynamics of the market economy that offered new opportunities and a higher standard of living. Several persons unjustly persecuted as "rightists" or "counter-revolutionaries" had been rehabilitated. Yet the highest hopes, raised following the death of Mao and the trial of the Gang of Four, had been dashed by some harsh realities. The brief season of the Democracy Wall had indicated how full of obstacles the road to a "fifth modernization" was and how difficult it would be for anyone in the civil society to exercise a greater degree of personal initiative. The dilemma confronting Chinese leaders was decisive: how far to go in the liberalization process. New China was developing on a totally new course, and the contradictions that marked this path were tackled by trying to unite the original ideology with a pragmatism labelled "socialism with Chinese characteristics". When Hu Yaobang in his historic speech marking the 60th anniversary (1921-1981) of the Communist Party of China (CPC) rejected the excesses of Maoism, he did not hesitate to confirm the fidelity to the Marxist ideology on which the New China had been built.3 The 12th CPC Congress in September 1982 took the same lines4 in re-elaborating the Party's constitution. And the Preamble of the country's new Constitution made it clear that its formulation had been guided by the "Four Basic Principles" (leadership of the CPC, Marxism-Leninism-Mao Zedong Thought, democratic dictatorship, the socialist road).5 The mirage of easy money rapidly eroded ideals and convinced the leaders that greater freedom would be detrimental for the growth of socialist China. To counter the new trend, the government proposed models of selflessness and social commitment, like the legendary young soldier Lei Feng, to the youth, and an iron fist policy was used whenever the power felt threatened by deviating trends. Government and Party launched a nation-wide campaign for a "socialist spiritual civilization," which was even enshrined in the new Constitution. Not surprisingly the stress on the civic virtues, love of the motherland, patriotism etc., was charged with a clear ideological overtone.6 A basic document on religion The fact that in the new climate the officially recognized religions as well as popular superstitious practices showed an unexpected growth among the common people, was obviously worrisome to the conservative top leaders. This prompted the Central Committee of the CPC to elaborate an internal document, sent for discussion at provincial and county level conferences around the country in preparation for the Party congress. The classified lengthy directive, carrying n. 19 and dated March 31, 1982, dealt with "the basic policy and standpoint our country should have on the religious question during this period of socialism"'.7 The authoritative statement tried to solve the practical contradiction emerging from the strategic choice of the "policy of religious freedom" made by an all powerful Party convinced that religion is a negative factor: "under the premise of protecting the freedom of religious belief, we greatly develop the socialist economy, culture, science and technology, and achieve great progress in developing socialist material and spiritual civilizations, so as gradually to eliminate the social and cognitive sources that have given rise to religion and enable it to exist".8 Document n. 19 is still considered today, two decades later, "an important document (...) the first document that clearly proposed carrying out supervision over religious matters according to law".9 For the five approved religions and particularly for the Catholic Church, 1982 was a year of development, but in line with the general climate involved a great many difficulties and sufferings. In Shanghai, where at Christmas 1981 only one Catholic church was open for worship, eight more were opened during 1982. The total number of churches all over China was more than 200 for Catholics and some 250 for the Protestants.10 The year 1982 also marked a turning point for the survival of the recognized religions: permission was given to recruit and train a new generation of ministers. So, after a 30-year hiatus, the first Catholic seminary was reopened in Shanghai in October 1982 by the rector Father, later Bishop, Jin Luxian. Another soon opened in Beijing. The Protestants were also going ahead with a plan to print one million copies of the Bible in China. Lights and shadows for the Church On the evening of Easter 1982, while attending Mass in the freshly redecorated cathedral of Xi'an, I was enthralled by the enthusiasm of the overflow crowd of faithful of all ages, singing at full voice the Credo in Latin, alternating with a choir of young people. The man kneeling next to me, in his forties, was reading from a thick hand written notebook, in which besides the common prayers, he had copied the songs and a transliteration of the Latin Missa de Angelis, using small numbers to indicate the musical notes. The year before, in Shanghai, I had a chance to visit an elderly Jesuit, Fr. Vincent Zhu Hongsheng, who had been released after 23 years of labour camp. In the small apartment where he was living with his brother, he spoke no words of recrimination about the suffering of the past years. Rather, he had expressions of great respect for the new leaders of the country, enjoying the feeling of being a free man again, as he put it. He was planning his future with confidence, convinced that the new religious policy would allow him to make a positive contribution to the Catholic cause without renouncing his principles. But he was soon to discover, like many others, that rehabilitation did not take away from him the stigma of having been a "criminal." He was an easy target of the Public Security, who followed his every step and soon got tired of his daring. He was arrested again in November 1981, in Shanghai, with seven other priests, guilty of "organizing pilgrimages and communicating directives of the Vatican to Chinese Catholics".11 The summer months of 1981 had seen also the unfolding of the absurd "case" of Bishop Dominic Deng Yiming of Guangzhou, first rehabilitated after 28 years of prison, then vilified and dismissed again for having dared to accept the title of archbishop from the Pope. The same thing happened to Bishop Peter Joseph Fan Xueyan of Baoding. Freed in 1979 after 21 years of detention, he took for granted that the new freedom would allow him to perform his episcopal tasks. He was re-arrested on April 13, 1982, and in July 1983 he was condemned again to ten years in prison for "anti-revolutionary crimes". One could recall many more instances of violent repression that occurred in those years, while at the same time the Christian faith seemed to attract more and more people. It was in such a climate that Pope John Paul II took the initiative of writing to all the bishops of the world to share with them his "deep concern," asking them to pray for the Church in China, that it might be "ensured the indispensable conditions to enjoy also visible union" with the rest of the Church.12 Then on March 21, 1982 the Pope celebrated a Mass in Saint Peter's Basilica for the Christians in China, in the presence of representatives of the Chinese Catholic communities living in Italy.13 The international media often headlined these events as prayers for the "persecuted Church in China". The Pope himself had not used any such expression nor had he made any specific reference to the sufferings of the Catholics in China. China's reaction was extremely violent. In a statement distributed by the official agency Xinhua on the eve of the papal Mass in St Peter's Basilica, Bishop Michael Yang Gaojian accused the Pope of "vicious slander", for calling on the Catholic Churches all over the world to pray for "the persecuted Church in China". "We will launch a counter-attack if Pope John Paul II does not call a halt to his false testimonies and accusations".14 He also defended the new arrest in Shanghai of "Zhu Hongsheng and other counter-revolutionaries in religious clothing", saying that this would "purify the Church". Bishop Yang Gaojian in his statement underlined that "ever since the founding of New China all the clergy and laity of the Chinese Catholic Church have been enjoying the right of freedom of religion (except the ten years of the 'Cultural Revolution')". Bishop Yang also mentioned that some structural changes that had occurred. "The Bishops' Conference of the Chinese Catholic Church was founded in 1980. In the past few years, national and diocesan administrative organizations have been set up and Church affairs have gradually expanded". In 1982, in fact, the Catholic Church, though numerically insignificant, was growing because of its vitality, but the gulf separating its inner reality from the understanding by the official authorities was as wide as ever. The government could count on a small number of clergy totally sharing its positions, while most of them were struggling to gain a measure of breathing space. Two controversial points The great stumbling block was evidently the Pope. Genuine Chinese Catholics considered the Holy Father the natural link for their unity with the Universal Church. For the Chinese authorities he was only the head of a foreign State; therefore, they considered it their right (and even their duty) to protect the "independence" of the Catholic Church in China from the Pope's "interference". The second major bone of contention was the functioning of traditional Church structures, starting from the authority of bishops.15 The constitution given to the Catholic Bishops' Conference, when it was established in 1980, had in fact emptied it of real meaning. Document 19, while acknowledging the new structures created in the national assemblies of all the recognized religions in 1980, was very clear: "The basic task of all these patriotic associations is to assist the Party and the government to carry out and implement its religious policy (...) to help the broad mass of religious believers (...) to raise their awareness of patriotism and socialism (...). All patriotic religious organizations must follow the Party's and the government's leadership". This refers also to the Catholic Bishops' Conference, which therefore is not the final reference point in religious affairs. About that time, the first timid efforts were made by Chinese scholars to investigate the religious phenomenon according to Deng's formula of "searching truth from facts", rather than from theoretical presuppositions. In Gu Changsheng's book, published in Shanghai in 1981, on the foreign missionary presence in China, the accent was still on a negative a priori general evaluation of missionary work, though some appreciation was also expressed for the scientific contribution made during the late Ming dynasty.16 History seemed to be a good starting point and the positive experience of Matteo Ricci offered an acceptable point of reference.17 These facts gave me the conviction that to overcome the lack of understanding between the politicians responsible for the religious policy and Church people, there was a need for a serious cultural effort. I expressed this conviction in the concluding pages of a modest publication on the contradictory developments of the Catholic Church in China since Mao's death, which appeared in Hong Kong in mid 1982.18 I was also suggesting there that a dialogue between Chinese and Western scholars interested in the field of religion would help. to bridge the existing gap between dogmatic ideological positions and the reality of life, by focussing on the needs and experiences of people. The year 1982 happened to mark the fourth centenary of the arrival of Matteo Ricci to the Chinese empire, and the date did not pass unnoticed. The July issue of China Pictorial (n. 7, 1982) carried an appreciation of Matteo Ricci as a "bridge between East and West".19 In November, a symposium was held in Macerata, Matteo Ricci's hometown, and in Rome, at the Gregorian University where he had studied. This event was also the occasion for an important address by Pope John Paul II, who praised Matteo Ricci's love for China's ancient culture, and expressed the hope that it might be possible to open a new dialogue in the same spirit of understanding and fruitful cooperation.20 New China in 2002 Twenty years have passed since then, and China has changed dramatically in many ways. At the beginning of 2002 the leaders of the PRC can proudly show great achievements, with an economic growth continuing to develop at a high rate. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) held in Shanghai last October, with the participation of George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin, clearly confirmed the high international status the New China has reached. That status was marked also by the successful bidding for the 2008 Olympic Games, and by China's admission into the World Trade Organization (WTO). China is a huge building yard, with infrastructure projects of colossal proportion launched in March 2001 with Zhu Rongji's five-year plan. The plan aims to reduce the negative impact of the growing number of people losing their jobs due to the privatization or closure of uncompetitive state enterprises. An American scholar, R.A. Manning, recognizes that "China's successes have been impressive in the 22 years since it implemented its reform and opening policies, lifting some 250 million people out of absolute poverty and more than quintupling per capita gross domestic output".2l But he warns: "Every step forward in its transformation has generated a new wave of problems". Manning is convinced that "the hardest part of China's transformation lies ahead. It has barely begun to move from a guanxi based society, in which advancement is based on personal relations, to one based on the rule of law". He adds: "The depth of China's internal problems was confirmed in a remarkably candid report published in June 2001 by a group under the Communist Party's Central Committee. It details mounting and increasingly confrontational 'collective protests and group incidents', on a greater scale that had otherwise been reported. It cites corruption as the main fuse exacerbating conflicts between officials and the masses". The magnitude of the corruption plague is not easily brought to light, due mainly to a conspiracy of silence protecting corrupt people in powerful positions. This was revealed by the recent trials of Shenyang's vice-mayor Ma Xiangdong and his accomplices, of Huang Zhengxian, deputy head of police in a city of the Guangxi Autonomous Region,22 accused of being linked with the Triads, or of Li Jizhou trusted with a national campaign against smuggling, and in fact connected with a criminal gang in Xiamen. Many are of the opinion that a vast network of local mafia connections can still operate the big business of smuggling heroin produced at the border with Myanmar, and the illegal emigrants heading for the USA and Europe from Fujian and Zhejiang. Working for an effective rule of law The media by exposing unlawful or criminal practices could help the fight against corruption. In March 2001, an explosion at a village school in Jiangxi province caused the death of 42 persons, mostly children. Local administrators tried to keep reporters away and to cover up the legal violation, not uncommon in poor areas, of using school children to manufacture firecrackers for business. Two tin mines were flooded on July 17 in Nandan county of Guangxi, causing at least 81 deaths, but the accident was reported only at the beginning of August, and the central authorities could send an investigating team. Another mine disaster occurred the year before in which about 200 people were killed, but the county authorities had been able to cover up the truth.23 A Hong Kong paper, commenting editorially on the fact, mentioned that Prime Minister Zhu Rongji has encouraged the state-run media to report on the dark side of society more aggressively. But it added: "It is no secret that news reports on the mainland are restricted and highly selective. The Communist Party propaganda machine has imposed draconian restrictions on news reports the leaders consider sensitive or negative".24 The paper, recalling that only those reports issued by the official Xinhua news agency are permitted, added that, after several recent disasters, the media tend to go beyond these limitations, convinced that their work is crucial to social progress and justice. But old conservative traditions are hard to change, as was shown by the suspension or closure of eight publications recently. At the beginning of July 2001, the chief editors of 150 key periodicals were summoned to Beijing for a two-day conference "to study publicity regulations" issued in a recent internal document.25 The call for a more democratic way of ruling the country and respect for human rights are still very sensitive points. On the first issue no open discussion is tolerated, though many politicians consider that changes in the long run may be inevitable.26 On the touchy issue of human rights (with wide discretionary powers given to the Public Security Bureau, frequent use of torture, etc.), the on-going polemic with the West is well known. So, many observers criticize the "strike hard" campaign with its large number of capital executions,27 although it seems that a large section of internal public opinion in China considers it a positive measure. President Jiang Zemin, in a long interview given to a leading American newspaper in Beidahe in August 2001 said that China's political reform has been going on without respite, and he mentioned also the role of the press. But he added, "Democracy cannot be the same here as in the Western world (...). What we are aiming at is combining the fundamental principles of Marxism with the real condition of China".28 The People's Congress is committed to improve China's legal system, although its slow pace is often criticized.29 According to a recent report,30 in order to meet the requirements for joining the WTO, the Chinese State Council proceeded to clean up its administrative rules, by abolishing 71 regulations and preparing the abolition of 80 more. In doing so, according to the report, the Chinese government "also conveyed a strong message to all local authorities that a transparent legal environment is not a scheme on paper". In an effort to keep abreast of market economy, the State Council had rectified some 756 administrative regulations by the end of 2000. On the other hand, local authorities have implemented over 7,000 legislative documents over the years. "As the number of laws grow", the comment goes on, "so does confusion over what sometimes appears to be contradictory mandates", and this makes a demanding task for the government "to make policies and regulations transparent, as well as stable and predictable". In early 2001, China ratified the United Nations Covenant on Economic and Social Rights and is cooperating with the UN Commission for Human Rights. Some analysts consider the progress too limited, if not a mere show case. But the magnitude of problems facing the government of such a huge country has also to be taken into consideration, says Frankfurt sociology Professor J. Habermas after an extensive tour of China: "We may criticize them, but the Chinese rightly expect the West not to face them in a colonial style". "Today", he adds, "they look with great hope to Europe".31 The European Union, in fact, though critical, is working to engage China in a positive cooperation.32 One is justified in asking how the religions, and particularly the Catholic Church, are faring within the context of China's present tremendous economic progress and problems. The government's White Papers boast that religions never had it so good in China. In fact, the overall number of believers keeps growing in the country.33 The Catholic Church confirms a remarkable improvement, with estimated statistics at the end of 2000 totalling 12 million baptized, 5,000 churches, 128 bishops, 2,200 priests, 3,650 Sisters, 1,700 seminarians, and 2,500 Sisters in formation.34 Christmas Eve 2001 saw the usual crowds going to the churches: a news report in the official press mentioned that the Guangzhou cathedral "was packed full with people standing in the aisles", and in Beijing, with a frosty minus-10 degrees Celsius, "a queue stretching for 100 meters stood patiently outside a church, waiting for permission to get into the sanctuary".35 The quality of Christian life seems to be improving too, with even the rift between official and "underground" Catholic communities tending generally to be softened, as was revealed when two old "unofficial" bishops (Victor Liu Hede of Hankou and Matthias Pei Shangde of Beijing) recently died. Even the language used in the official Catholic publications or by leaders of the official Church structures seems to be more guarded than in the past.36 But during the recent two decades recurrent cases of the heavy handed treatment of believers by Public Security personnel have frequently come to light, making public opinion in Western countries quite critical of China's religious policy. And the general atmosphere seems to have deteriorated since the government's crackdown on the Falun Gong movement, declaring it an "evil cult". I do not intend to delve here into some serious and numerous cases of harassment of Catholic clergy and lay faithful. I would rather consider two long-standing issues: the role of the Roman Pontiff and the authority of the Catholic Bishops, trusting that they will be read as a constructive contribution for improvement. Calling for dialogue in the name of Matteo Ricci In the course of 2001, commemorating the fourth centenary of the privilege granted to Fr Matteo Ricci to live in the capital of the Empire, various studies have underlined this missionary's positive approach. There were also some noteworthy academic events. On the occasion of a conference held in Rome at the Gregorian University, a message sent by Pope John Paul II deserves attention.37 Considering the shining example of this pioneer, the Pope asked "what is the message he (Ricci) can offer to the great Chinese nation and to the Catholic Church?" Underlining Ricci's attitude of "highest respect" and "selfless service", the Pope adds that "Today too, the Catholic Church seeks no privilege from China and its leaders, but solely the resumption of dialogue in order to build a relationship based upon mutual respect and deeper understanding". John Paul II has clear words of appreciation: "The Chinese people, especially in more recent times, have set themselves important objectives in the field of social progress. The Catholic Church for her part regards with respect this impressive thrust and far-sighted planning, and with discretion offers her own contribution in the promotion and defence of the human person, and the person's values, spirituality and transcendent vocation. The Church has very much at heart the values and objectives which are of primary importance also to modern China: solidarity, peace, social justice, the wise management of the phenomenon of globalization, and the civil progress of all peoples". "Let it be known to China", the Pope adds, "The Catholic Church has a keen desire to offer, once more, her humble and selfless service for the good of Chinese Catholics and of all the people of the country". And again: "I hope and pray that the path opened by Father Matteo Ricci between East and West, between Christianity and Chinese culture, will give rise to new instances of dialogue and reciprocal human and spiritual enrichment". The Pope is worried about the dramatic situation of the world: "The present moment of profound disquiet in the international community calls for a fervent commitment on the part of everyone to creating and developing ties of understanding, friendship and solidarity among peoples". This is the reason why he insists on a joint effort with the great Chinese nation: "It is no secret that the Holy See, in the name of the whole Catholic Church and, I believe, for the benefit of the whole human family, hopes for the opening of some form of dialogue with the authorities of the People's Republic of China". In echoing John Paul's message the international press underlined the fact that he expressed deep sadness for certain "errors and limits of the past" rather than these substantial aspects, when he acknowledged that "the work of members of the Church in China was not always without error, the bitter fruit of their personal limitations and of the limits of their action". He refers obviously in the first place to the foreign missionaries, whose "outstanding evangelizing commitment" he also praised, together with their great works in promoting human development, "which were widely and gratefully welcomed by the Chinese people". The Pope refers principally to a kind of "protection" on the part of European political powers in certain periods of modern history. And, in a noble act of humility, he repeats: "For all of this I ask the forgiveness and understanding of those who may have felt hurt in some way by such actions on the part of Christians". He also expressed the conviction that "historical truth must be sought serenely, with impartiality and in its entirety (...). I can assure you that the Holy See is always ready to offer willing cooperation in this research". Old problems are still there In the Catholic world the Pope's courageous message was generally highly praised. Western media acknowledged John Paul's role in promoting peace and cooperation, in pursuit of "the good of all mankind". In Beijing the reaction seems to have been cautiously positive, although the local media didn't find room for the news.38 A well-known commentator, Fr J. Heyndrickx, thinks that the reason for China's "poor" reaction to the Pope's magnanimous gesture is "the Chinese leaders' internal division on this issue".39 He mentions a decision supposedly taken by President Jiang Zemin in 1999 after his return from a visit to Europe, following which the authorities in charge of religious affairs were told to meet at all levels with bishops and priests to tell them the news and prepare them for a change. But then he adds: "By the end of 1999 we learned of a 'secret document' (dated August 17, 1999) of the CPC, stating that China would indeed normalize relations, but it would also strengthen the official Catholic Patriotic Association, so as to keep full control over the Catholic Church, thwarting thereby the Vatican influence over the Chinese Church". To prove this point, the government, "led by a leftist group in China", organized the confrontational initiative of ordaining five new bishops in Beijing on January 6, 2000. This successfully undermined President Jiang's plan. Other episcopal ordinations followed in defiance of the Church's longstanding law. Then on the Roman side came the unfortunate incident of the solemn canonization of 120 China Martyrs. Even the explanation given personally by Cardinal Etchegaray, a recognized friend of China, to the highest authorities in Beijing, of how the date (October 1) had been chosen in the busy schedule of the Great Jubilee Year with no malicious intent, was not sufficient to defuse the mounting anti-Vatican campaign that swept all over China. This new crisis only underlined the impasse that has been dragging on for 50 years between Rome and Beijing, creating painful divisions inside Chinese society and negative reactions abroad. To whose benefit? In his speech on July 2001 to mark the 80th anniversary of the CPC's foundation, President Jiang Zemin made the bold move to open the Party to the new class of capitalists, thus applying his "Three Represents" theory. He insisted also that "moral development is a crucial part of the country's task for developing an advanced socialist culture", an idea he had already expressed when proposing a combination of law and morality.40 In his opening address at the high-level three-day national conference on religion held recently in Beijing, President Jiang warned the Chinese leadership about the impact of religion on the political and social life of the world. An editorial in the People's Daily underlined the importance of the conference attended by all seven members of the Politburo Standing Committee, saying: "A new phase has thus appeared in China's religious work;" but little has been revealed so far about the discussions and decisions reached at this exceptional event.41 President Jiang is said to have confirmed the traditional position: Communist Party members must stand firm on their atheistic principles; then he added: "We must recognize the fact that religions will exist under socialism for long time (...). We must not use administrative power to destroy religions but at the same time we cannot use administrative power to develop them".42 The question is: can this well known official ideology be applied in the new society emerging from the open market economy without creating new confrontation? When almost two years ago the national director of the Religious Affairs Bureau (RAB) under the State Council, Ye Xiaowen, in a very influential paper, explained the "religious work" of his office at the turn of the new century, his hard line was quite evident. He presented the directives using three key words: "Emphasize Policy, Strengthen Management, Promote Adaptation". And to show how the Party "has in practice closely linked the Marxist concept on religion with the religious question. as it exists in China," he listed ten points. The last one reads: "(We) implement education in a scientific worldview of dialectical and historical materialism (including atheism) among the masses, especially the large mass of young people".43 It is difficult to see this commitment to propagate atheism as a fitting approach for a department entrusted with the supervision of religions in a civilized modern country.44 Besides, when explaining his aim "to actively guide religion to adapt to socialist society", Mr. Ye wrote: "Religion will gradually come to assimilate some elements from secular morality and rationality (...). This cannot but influence the reform of its religious ideology and system". It is questionable whether this effort to change the nature of religion is in the interest of Chinese society. One cannot but think that, although the old view of religion as opium has long been dropped from official statements, the very powerful machine supervising the religious sector is still tempted to apply the practices of old.45 With reference to this problem, President Jiang Zemin is quoted as having said at the national conference: "Asking religions to adapt to socialism doesn't mean we want the religious workers and believers to give up their faith. Instead, we ask them to embrace our socialist system, the leadership of the Communist Party, follow the country's rules and regulations ...and contribute to ethnic and national unity.46 We can only hope that the President's words may mean respect for the rights of believers as well. Aiming at international standards President Jiang has also declared that China has adopted the principle of separating politics from religion.47 If this principle is really fully implemented, many things would have to change. A modern society cannot be governed in the old feudalistic style, where the ruler, representing Heaven, is the supreme arbiter of religious "orthodoxy". In proceeding to separate politics from religion, a first urgent need is to repeal biased prescriptions accumulated during periods of harsh leftist thinking. It is inconceivable that administrative regulations forbidding religious instruction to youths under 18 years of age still exist today, and that over-zealous cadres may apply them also to families of believers. It is inconceivable that legitimate publications produced by different religions are still banned from sale on public stands, treating them almost as pornographic material or anti-state propaganda. It is inconceivable that the results of study and research by scholars investigating the present day religious situation in China can be considered classified materials, and not be allowed free circulation among the public. China is working to conform its legislation and administrative regulations to its new conditions and new responsibilities. There is an urgent need to apply this revision to all fields, putting into practice also the principle of separating politics and religion.48 It is worth mentioning that even in Taiwan, where human, rights had a poor record due to prevailing emergency legislation, a national commission is being established to codify world human rights into domestic legislation.49 In the early 1980's; there were consultations in the PRC to prepare a basic law on religious questions. But it did not materialize. Instead, the past 20 years have seen some 50 new documents and regulations, issued by departments of public administration even at provincial and local levels, aiming only to assure a more efficient control over religions.50 At the December 2001 national conference both President Jiang and Premier Zhu Rongji are said to have called for the building of Party organizations among grassroots religious believers, strengthening the Party's leadership over religious work, and assuring tighter management of religious affairs in rural areas.51 According to an official report, President Jiang explained that such work "must serve the maintenance of stability, the advancement of unity, socialist modernization, the complete reunification of the motherland, and world peace and development".52 To assure the advancement of unity, while religious believers are asked to accept the CPC's leadership, they should not be punished with unnecessary burdens. One point of concern is the wide scope granted to the Patriotic Associations of the recognized religions, which often lord it over the respective religious groups thanks to their close connection with the Public Security organs. On the Catholic side, the refusal of many local communities to register with the Catholic Patriotic Association (CPA) is due more to the poor record of its leaders, who appear to care little for the Catholic faith they profess, than to uproot an anti-government attitude. Sometimes these so called "underground" communities, who have chosen to risk being considered "illegal" rather than to report to the CPA, have been paying very heavily for their defiance. Such was the case of the 500 Catholic families constituting about 70% of the population of a village in Zhejiang province, whose church was destroyed three times by the Public Security in the past couple of years, because of their refusal to join the CPA.53 Yet, even the communities involved in such cases of open confrontation cannot be accused of being anti-social or unpatriotic. Hopefully, if a report on the Beijing national conference proves true, "it will become easier for Churches and other religious organizations to register" directly with the RAB, without having to go through the Patriotic Associations.54 The main beneficiaries of this change would be the numerous Protestant "House Churches", but it will surely help also to reduce tension among many Catholic rural communities. Such a reasonable form of compromise would ensure both the authority of the State and more freedom of conscience for the citizens. Pope John Paul II has committed himself publicly to work along these lines: "The Catholic Church has a keen desire to offer... her humble and selfless service for the good of Chinese Catholics and of all the people of the country". He is convinced that, in the present situation of international tension, a form of cooperation of the Church with the authorities of the PRC would be "for the benefit of the whole human family". To make such cooperation possible a deep sense of realism would be required, both on the part of the Holy See and of the Chinese authorities. Beijing Professor He Guanghu recalled a historic example with regard to the 300 years long controversy over the Rites; this in fact could be solved (in 1939) when the Catholic Church (concerned with her faith) acknowledged the question as a cultural one, and the State (determined to confirm its authority) saw it as simply a social issue.55 A comment, which appeared in a Hong Kong newspaper about the Pope's message, suggested that a successful negotiation would require the prospect of some gain for both sides. Using the pen name of Bao Rung, the writer observed that at present, with the vast majority of the bishops of the registered church united with Rome, the Vatican could be considered the winning side, while the Chinese government would gain nothing.56 In reality, the Holy See has constantly signalled its readiness to acknowledge that governments should have their say in the appointment of bishops. Furthermore, a negotiation reaching a peaceful settlement with the Vatican, plus the assurance of getting a favorable international reaction in the Western world, and signalling a positive outlook toward the "one China" policy, would definitely constitute a clear internal victory for the government, and help defuse any motive for social unrest. An important role for scholars A positive sign is the growing interest in the religious phenomenon among academics in different universities, giving place to research of high quality, conducted scientifically.57 This became possible thanks to the new climate prevailing since the early 1980's. Today, this development can help the Party and State leadership to be better informed. At the beginning of August 2001 the Society of Religious Studies of China, which constitutes the largest body studying religion in the country, held its fifth national congress in Beijing.58 The report presented there states: "Further efforts to approach religious studies in a scientific, theoretic and standardized manner will help the government in making policies that can better conform to the interests of religious believers as well as atheists". Challenged by the new international requirements, the Chinese government is in ever-greater need of the contribution of intellectuals. In June 2001, the office of academic research consulted with professors specializing in different fields, from economy to philosophy and law, asking among other questions an evaluation about the role of religion in present day China. Though it is difficult to overcome prejudices and suspicions, the study of sociology, for instance, which was controlled by the CPC Department of Propaganda, is now gaining greater attention. Besides consulting the scholars, in order to improve its religious policy the government would do well to listen to the new generation of cadres and entrepreneurs, who are in const contact and more attuned to international standards. Significantly, President Jiang Zemin has repeatedly asked responsible cadres of all departments to acquaint themselves with the religious phenomenon. At the three-day Beijing meeting, Premier Zhu "ordered that more officials of younger age and higher political and cultural quality be recruited into religion management departments", while President Jiang "pledged closer consultations between the Party and the government and religious circles, especially on major issues concerning religion".59 These are significant choices, because so far religions were at most the "object" of study by cadres, and decisions were usually imposed from above, with little consultation and less consideration for the specific nature and needs of the religions. If only part of the energy and effort spent in the past on fighting the Catholic Church had been devoted to promoting a serious, systematic study of her social doctrine and practice, particularly among the underprivileged of the world, many errors could have been avoided. To defuse the still prevailing contradictions existing in China and to facilitate the acceptance of international standards at all levels of public administration, a vast cultural operation is necessary. A basic need is to reach a common understanding on the meaning of the words used, starting from the very expression of religious freedom.60 For instance, the usual interpretation given so far in China to the principle of "separating religion from politics" was that "we must never allow religion to interfere in the administration of the state and the law or in school or social public education" (as amply explained in Document 19 of 1982); but on the contrary, the political power was considered justified to meddle in matters concerning the religions. The same ambiguity can be observed when stressing that religions should be independent, which is commonly interpreted only in the sense that "religious bodies and religious affairs are not subject to any foreign domination" (as specified in Art. 36 of the Constitution), while independence of religions from the state is never even taken into consideration. Again, with the Constitution stating (also in Art. 36) that "no state organ, public organization or individual may compel citizens to believe in, or not to believe in, any religion", it should be clear that an official policy asking Catholics to "adapt" to the socialist situation cannot go as far as to force them to renounce spiritual and ordinary relations with the Roman Pontiff. It would be a basic misunderstanding and totally erroneous not to recognize that that is a substantial aspect of Catholic faith.61 New China is rightly proud of the dignity and respect it has gained on the international scene, but it would be naïve to think that other nations, who recognize the Pope's right of supervising Catholic life within their boundaries, have abdicated part of their sovereignty. To be able to grow and develop in justice and peace a modern society needs to lay its foundation on strong moral principles. To assure this, State laws are not enough. Recent history in Europe shows how ideologies pretending to take on the role of religion and to fulfil ultimate human aspirations have failed. The contribution that religions can offer would prove a gain for all also in a pluralistic society.
Endnotes 1.
The People's Daily published the full text of the Draft on April 28,
1982.
Ref.: Tripod (Religious Trends in China Today), Vol. XXII, n. 124, Spring 2002. |