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Arij
A. Roest Crollius, SJ 1. The Main Intentions in Interreligious Dialogue Before getting into the core of our question: what is sincerity and how far does it reach? — we first discuss the various forms of Interreligious Dialogue. 1.1 Practical Dialogue. Meant is a dialogue that is praxis-oriented. The participants aim at a common action. We do not speak about any kind of participants. In an Interreligious Dialogue people with a religious inspiration and outlook are involved. And in their conceiving a joint project, they are motivated by their religious background. Moreover, in working together, and doing the job which they undertook, they find strength also in their religion. A question: does this exclude people who do not profess any religious creed, or do not belong to an established religion? — Certainly not! Their presence and taking part can even be very healthy. It can help religiously-minded people not to consider themselves as better than others. And often, people who call themselves non-religious, or even secularist or atheist, have a great sense of honesty, commitment and fidelity. Could it be that they are perhaps less distracted by otherwordly values? This practical dialogue has many forms. It goes from the village council in a pluri-religious setting to the collaboration of international organisations such as Red Cross, Crescent, Star of David and Singha Lion. The common task can also vary, from garbage collecting to fund collating. When this type of dialogue touches things as school education, setting-up a calendar of holidays, defining the working hours, things and people can become rather touchy. Verifying the sincerity of this kind of dialogue is not too difficult. It finds the proof of its sincerity in the result. Have you people just been talking, or have you also done something together? It would seem that this type of Interreligious Dialogue is a very basic and essential one. We can produce a lot of words in talk and script, and our PC’s help us in it with the touch of a finger. All this remains without evident value when there is not a common action. This type of dialogue is the nourishing ground of all other types. It is the humus from which mutual understanding can grow. And only on the basis of a lived, mutual understanding can we begin to talk about matters as peace and justice. Declarations of peace in international charters do not help very much, when people in the same town or region heartily hate each other. 1.2 Diplomatic Dialogue. At first sight, this seems to be a rather suspicious type of conversation. Diplomats have been stereotyped as people of mental duplicity. Moreover, agreeing to disagree appears a very meagre result of an encounter. And to this has to be added the question: in how far can participants in Interreligious Dialogue agree to disagree? Should they not object, refute, try to convince others? First on diplomacy. Diplomacy is an ancient virtue. In the Aristotelian catalogue of virtues, it would find its place between prudence and eutrapelia. Prudence, in this context, means the ability to say the right thing at the right moment, and eutrapelia adds to this the capacity to do it in a pleasant and even playful way. This is not against sincerity. It would be a very simplistic and naive idea of sincerity, to mean that one should always say all one has on one’s mind. This would be safe only for rather empty minds. Prudence in talking can have various motives. In an educative situation, it can be inspired by pedagogical considerations. Among friends and lovers, by a mixture of trust and thoughtfulness. In a courtroom, by fear. In Interreligious Dialogue the motive would be respect for the freedom of the others and faith in a divine will that goes beyond our short-lived, and therefore impatient plans and projects. In the context of Interreligious Dialogue, "to agree to disagree" manifests respect for the other, for the freedom of his conscience and choice. Call it diplomacy or by any other name. Though it might be good to re-value the word and task of diplomacy. We have, today, too many technicians and specialists who do the job of hammering out agreements which, more often than not, don’t work. For diplomacy, a degree of civilisation is needed, that goes beyond that of the technicians and specialists, beyond that of the homo faber. Something of the wisdom of the homo sapiens would have to appear on the scene. 1.3 Doctrinal-scientific dialogue in order to gain a better understanding. In the realm of Interreligious Dialogue this is a matter of common sense, and hence a rare phenomenon. "We know who those people are, and what their religion is worth. We have done our studies, and read books. We even read their books. So, there is little use in their coming to us, and saying that they like us after all". "Moreover, in practically all religions that are different from our own, people use such abstruse language. They don’t think in logical categories. Let them first put their ideas in an acceptable way, then we can talk". These and similar considerations mean that a sincere Interreligious Dialogue in order to learn from the other about his own religion is not very highly esteemed. Some think that one has to be gifted with paternalistic condescendence or with a tourist’s hunger for the exotic in order to venture on such a path. (Once I was in a drafting committee for the final declaration after a session of Interreligious Dialogue. We had written "during this meeting we have learned from each other". This sentence was dropped by the main body of dialogists. They argued: "If we say that we have learned from each other, we imply that we do not know everything. That would be a blame on our religion"). Secular universities are here far ahead of the specialists in religion. Progress of knowledge and understanding, also in the field of religions, is for them a matter of course. For those who engage in Interreligious Dialogue, the motivation really has to be to understand the other in his religion. But without doing as if oneself, one is without religion or faith. The quest to understand the other implies also his relation to me and mine to him. This way to understand the other’s religion is a long way. How much do we understand of our own religion? Moreover, the dialogue is difficult, because we speak different language. To force people of another religion, which has not originated and developed in western culture, to put their ideas in the categories of occidental thought would be to impose upon them a mental alienation. This is one of the troubles with western disciplines as Orientalism, Islamology, Hindology etc. However, it seems that people with few scientific hang-ups who live their religion in a sincere way are capable of type of dialogue. (I remember conversations with people of other faiths, in countries where travelling is measured not in hours but in days. Sometimes, I learned more in a day’s travel with some chance companions than in deep studies). 1.4 Doctrinal-assertive dialogue in order to convince the other of the validity of one’s own religion. Here, it seems, we finally have a type of Interreligious Dialogue which appears boldly sincere, otherwise it would not exist. If this kind of sincerity comes from both, or all sides that are involved in the dialogue, we get a show of good, old polemics. When done while observing some rules of the game, e.g. using civilised language and refraining from inflicting bodily harm on the other, then such a dialogue can even be refreshing. This type of colloquial behaviour is very difficult indeed. The own religious conviction and the preoccupation to convince the other make it an extremely arduous task to hear what the other is saying and to make a genuine effort to understand him or her or them. Very easily, what is planned as a dialogue becomes an exchange of monologues. When this happens in meetings set-up for the occasion, then these monologues can even be printed and bound together into a volume. (Not a few academic meetings of otherwise reasonable persons are conducted in this way). 1.5 Spiritual dialogue can lead to the discovery of the dialogal character of truth. With spiritual dialogue is meant here a conversation in which the word proceeds from the inner freedom of the person. Insofar as the inner truth is expressed, it does not any longer belong only to the one who expressed it: this truth is there also for the others. This truth exists now in order to be perceived. When the human person manifests itself, it is always in dialogue with other persons. In this, the inner truth of the human being shows its dialogal nature. In this free, inter-personal dialogue, the criterion of truth (being true or being false) is no longer uniquely found in the person which expresses itself, but in the movement of dialogue itself. This is not just an added characteristic of human truth, just during the time they are conversing. Truth without life, without dialogue, would be without meaning. It would be the expression of no one, perceived by no one. Hans Urs von Balthasar remarks in this context that in this type of dialogue the inner meaning of truth reveals itself as love. Only love can justify fully the dialogal movement. Moreover, since the word in this dialogue is a free word, it can only be perceived and admitted in freedom. No one can be forced to a dialogue where human persons meet as free persons. This is all the more true for Interreligious Dialogue. Without mutual love and trust, all the true things that are proffered remain senseless in a dialogue that has only the appearance of it. Love is founded on the fundamental decision of seeking a greater good for the other. Trust can be found only when you give it. Fidelem si putaveris invenies (Seneca: If you deem someone trustworthy, you will find him to be so). 1.6 The dialogue of friendship is a gratuitous sharing. Though friendship can be helpful for many things, and can facilitate collaborations that lead to great results, it does not need any scope outside itself. The sharing of friends is just because they are friends. This kind of gratuitousness is, I would dare to think, rare in Interreligious Dialogue. Not only because friendship is rare. Friendships vary in intensity and duration. But to enjoy an exchange on religious topics or rather, on religious experiences, in the same way one would enjoy together a symphony, a walk or a sunset, how often did we encounter that in Interreligious Dialogue? The answer is difficult to give. Normally people don’t put such an experience in the paper. One finds instances of this in Stories of the Fathers of the Deserts, in Zen Stories, in Rabbinic literature. However rare this type of Interreligious Dialogue, it can never be authentic without at least an element of gratuitousness. And once an element, even infinitesimally small, is there, then the entire dialogue becomes gratuitous, free, and open for the infinite. 1.7 Interreligious Dialogue is expected to be a religious dialogue. The religious nature of such a dialogue does not consist in the number of prayers said or the professions of faith made, but in one, basic conviction. It is the awareness that the truth of our creed and religion is not our possession. That it is much greater than we are. It is an awareness of the truth and reality "which engulfs our being, and whence we take our rise, and whither our journey leads us" (NA 1). The knowledge of standing before the majesty of a truth that is always greater than the human heart and mind makes the participants in Interreligious Dialogue modest and unpretentious. Perhaps the awareness comes to them, that they do not have to defend truth, but that truth defends them. Perhaps they discover that they do not have to seek truth, but that truth has found them. Then all the other intentions and forms of Interreligious Dialogue, of which we have mentioned a few, come together in the hearts of the participants in such a dialogue. And without their having done much for it, they discover themselves in a new mode of being. Their very existence has become dialogue. 2. The Pitfalls of Insincerity 2.1 Lack of trust, suspicion, fear. It is not very pleasant to deal with this sort of topics. Brevity may be helpful. For the sake of clarity, however, these negative sides have to be mentioned. This first, little point is clear by itself. Suspicion and fear make any type of human conversation impossible, also Interreligious Dialogue. 2.2 Religious indifference, scepticism, cynicism. Also this point seems self-evident. How can one with religious indifference engage in Interreligious Dialogue? However, there is a type of religious indifference which seems to make some people rather fond of Interreligious Dialogue. That is the idea that "all religions say the same. Why should they talk about differences? Let us rather go on together, on the path of the unique and only divine truth!". This is a special form of religious indifference: the indifference toward a rational expression of religious truth. This makes a rational dialogue impossible. Also without having recourse to an idea of the vagueness of divine truth itself, there are persons who are sceptical with regard to all human knowledge of truth. In a non-reflexive, practical way, this sceptical attitude can be called one of the social mental illnesses of today. In front of the vastness of human knowledge and experience, and the intricacy of the way things function, from atoms to stellar systems, many simply give up to understand it or to make sense of it. The vast stream of information in which today’s society is engulfed contributes to this indifference. This attitude has its consequences, not only on the religious level, but also in ethical behaviour. Since it so difficult to know where responsibilities are located in the complicated society, what is the difference what choice the single person makes? Is there still room for ethical behaviour? That such an attitude can lead to the autocratic behaviour of the cynics, is also clear. Should we call this insincerity? One might rather speak of an incapacity to be sincere. 2.3 Self-sufficiency and cultural remoteness can cause a lack of interest in other religions and in the people who believe in other creeds. In sufficiency there is, at least, a kind of sincerity, which says: "I am not interested in you, neither in what you believe in". But this sincerity is not very helpful for Interreligious Dialogue. Cultural differences are a more complicated problem in Interreligious Dialogue. Above all, there is the question of language. It would seem that, in the present movement of globalisation, English is going to be the most universally spoken language. But is English helpful for Interreligious Dialogue? Most religions have their own language, often since millennia. And many hold on to it for their cultic practices and their religious studies. These religions cannot be really understood without a knowledge of their particular language. 2.4 Aggressiveness, insecurity. Both, normally, go together. Aggressiveness is one of the manifestations of insecurity. And insecurity is, in religious matters, often found among sects and sect-like groups, such as fundamentalists (understood here not in its specific, American sense, but in the broad sense used today for conservative movements in various religions). This attitude can lead to some polemic conversations, but what we call the art of Interreligious Dialogue will not be much helped by it. 2.5 The absence of spiritual humanism means here the view, and more than that, the certainty that each human being is a person, spiritual and, as such, gifted with freedom. A good measure of personalism would be helpful for Interreligious Dialogue, which, all too often, is conducted’ by "representatives" of a given religion, and thus wavers between legitimate, and necessary, faithfulness, and an attitude which seems rather gregarious. If, in Interreligious Dialogue, we only exchange the official tenets of our respective religious, as they are embedded in the various traditions, the conversation can be instructive, but does not get much beyond the stage of "comparing notes". In such a context, it will be very difficult to discover the dialogal character of truth. This is only possible when we meet as persons, and when we can ask each other: "How do you live with this? What does this mean for you?". 2.6 Aloofness and coldness of heart makes friendship impossible. In such a situation, the participants in Interreligious Dialogue will have great difficulty coming to a gratuitous sharing of experiences. Interreligious Dialogue is an adventure, and with a heart that is aloof an cold, one does not get very far on this path. 2.7 One can know everything about a religion without having faith and faith experience. But what does one know? Not much more than the outer shell of a given religion, be it one’s own or that of others. The Vatican Document on Proclamation and Dialogue makes mention of the "Dialogue of religious experience", and depicts it as a dialogue "where persons, rooted in their own religious traditions, share their spiritual riches, for instance with regard to prayer and contemplation, faith and ways of searching God or the Absolute" (n. 43d). The question is then: do we share in communicating words or do we share in a communion? Perhaps we need many words in order to reach the awareness of a communion. Communion is a matter of being, communication has to do with expressions. Being is prior to expressions in words. Faith, surely not without the help of words, can touch being. Without faith, one can not break through the many logoi to the one logos that is the sense and meaning of our being. This brief survey of some of the difficulties in Interreligious Dialogue makes manifest that there are some elements which are necessary for it: faith, esteem of the human person, and knowledge, or at least, the desire to know. Interreligious Dialogue is sincere, when it tends to make progress in these three fields, precisely by means of dialogue. 3. How to Live with some of the Impossibilities of Interreligious Dialogue? 3.1 When fundamentalisms meet Interreligious Dialogue will not be easy, except, perhaps, in its initial, clarifying stages. It will be useful to understand the nature of today’s fundamentalist currents in the various religions. We know that the term "Fundamentalism" was first used on American soil, in the wake of a reaction against Liberal Protestant exegesis in the end of the 19th century. The name, properly, comes from the 12 volume work The Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth (1910-1912). In 1919 the World Christian Fundamental Association was formed. The movement was characterised by a literal exegesis of the Bible; some earlier millenarian ideas still live on; it was not without antisemitism, and strongly anti-communist. Today, the movement has the name The World Evangelical Fellowship (since 1948). But the term "Fundamentalism" was to stay, and is now used for conservative and integralistic currents in various religions. Fundamentalism is a complex phenomenon, but there are some recurrent features. We briefly mention them. 1. A literal reading of the Sacred Scriptures. Modern, and even less modern exegesis is rejected. The Word, as it was written in a given cultural and historical context, should be taken as it is, without interpreting it by its context. 2. The mediation of culture and history is rejected. The ideal is a return to the origins. 3. The tradition within the given religious group tends to become unchangeable scripture in its turn. 4. One cannot deny that there is often a selective reading of the Sacred Scriptures in Fundamentalist currents. But the criterium of selection is not always clear. 5. The Fundamentalist reaction has a strongly "male" character. It has been termed "The Revolution of the Patriarchs". Power appears to be a noticeable element in it. This exercises an attraction on women, who see in it a protection of family values, and on not a few among the youth, who find an outlet for asserting their strength, even in a violent way. 6. The movement gives a "sense of belonging", which is often lost in contemporary migratory changes and the assault of the media. 7. Dialogue, also Interreligious Dialogue, is seen as a weakness. However, dialogue with Fundamentalists is not impossible. Especially the first forms of Interreligious Dialogue mentioned above (collaboration, agreeing to disagree, comparison of tenets) can often be practised with fruit. After all, we live together in one village, global or not. A pragmatic approach can be helpful. 3.2 The choice between exclusive and inclusive language is one of the mechanisms at work in Interreligious Dialogue. In its simplest terms, this boils down to the use of "we" or "we and they". In this latter case, "they" receive special terms: "unbelievers, pagans, heretics, the massa damnata, etc". Also here, a pragmatic approach seems to be the only way to come to a dialogue. Perhaps that, as citizens of a country, or of the world, we can do something useful together. There are even situations which require some kind of collaboration as in a time of natural or social crisis. 3.3 The utility of logic in dialogue can seem a superfluous statement. But it can happen that sentiments, positive or negative, obscure a logical discourse. Even with positive sentiments one has to be at one’s guard. Feelings are fugacious. One cannot build a mutual understanding on them. Interreligious Dialogue requires the hard work of trying to understand others, and also how others understand us. One can compare Interreligious Dialogue with the art of mountain climbing. Some remain in the bar at the foot of the mountain. They "feel so well together". Others move on, on the arduous road. That is where logic and understanding enter. And still others go toward the high places, where they discover the logos beyond and in the many logoi. 3.4 The question of how we live with our history and histories would be a chapter in itself. But one thing is clear. In Interreligious Dialogue we have to try to understand each other’s reading of history. And where there are evident biases, we have to correct them. This can imply an urgent work of revising textbooks on history in use at our schools, and not only textbooks on religious education. 3.5 Every religion lives with a remembrance. It is, perhaps, very difficult to forget, even though our memory is selective. Negative memories, even if they cannot or should not be forgotten, make place for forgiveness. Forgiveness is only real when one discovers that there is nothing to be forgiven. Generations follow each other, and who can be held responsible for what? 3.6 A condition for progress in the art of dialogue is the capacity to see things from the point of view of the other. This operates an exchange of perspective, and can shed a new light on the problems we deal with. Often, in order to understand what a person says, one has first to understand the person. Moreover, sincerity is not obstructed by "putting between brackets" certain conflictive points. Not all problems or misunderstandings have to be solved today, and perhaps not even in this century. That is what is called "the art of epochè". 3.7 The Sage says: "There is a time to keep silence, and a time to speak" (Qoh 3:7). Dialogue, evidently, is a time to speak. But when, through the exchange of words, we touch something of the truth/ reality that becomes transparent in our Interreligious Dialogue, and the words become diaphanous for the Logos that engulfs and pervades all that is, then one can be overcome with awe before the majesty of truth, and one can even be forced to silence. Yet, with this sublime spiritual and religious perspective of the Interreligious Dialogue, and also because of it, there is one cause where silence can not take the place of words, and where words can not take the place of deeds. This is, when those who are engaged in dialogue become aware of human beings — companions in the pilgrimage of life — who are attacked in their dignity, deprived of their rights, forced to a life unworthy of human beings who have been called with a divine vocation. Then there is an urgency to the reality of deeds and of solidarity, of being-with-them. Perhaps then the noble efforts of reaching a deeper, mutual understanding in matters of religion and faith, by means of Interreligious Dialogue, will have to be suspended for a moment. And with this, this brief paper returns to from where it started. Text: from the author, in Inculturation, vol.XX, 1998
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